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The perception of a bistable stimulus as one or the other interpretation can be biased by prior presentations of that stimulus.
Such learning effects have been found to be long lasting even after small amounts of training. The effectiveness of training
may be inﬂuenced by preexposure to the ambiguous stimulus. Here we investigate the role of preexposure for learning a
position-dependent perceptual bias. We used rotating Necker Cubes as the bistable stimuli, which were presented at two
locations: above or below ﬁxation. On training trials, additional depth cues disambiguated the rotation direction contingent
on the location. On test trials, the rotating cube was presented without disambiguation cues. Without preexposure to the
ambiguous stimulus, subjects learned to perceive the cube to be rotating in the trained direction for both locations. However,
subjects that were preexposed to the ambiguous stimulus did not learn the trained percept–location contingency, even
though the preexposure was very short compared to the subsequent training. Preexposure to the disambiguated stimulus
did not interfere with learning. This indicates a fundamental difference between ambiguous test and disambiguated training
trials for learning a perceptual bias. In short, small variations in paradigm can have huge effects for the learning of
perceptual biases for ambiguous stimuli.
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Introduction
Human perception and behavior largely depends on
prior knowledge about relationships between the world
around us and the sensory inputs resulting from it. Most of
this prior knowledge has been learned and updated since
our infancy, but even in our adulthood our perceptual
system is continuously updating our knowledge (learning)
as we encounter new correlations. Learning these new
correlations can lead to changes so that the same sensory
input is perceived differently. Such learning effects appear
to occur on several different timescales. For instance,
depending on the statistics of the environment, adaptation
to a new visuomotor offset only needs a few trials of
exposure (e.g., Burge, Ernst, & Banks, 2008) and thus can
occur in about a minute. A longer exposure time, in the
order of 1 h, was needed for humans to learn to integrate
previously uncorrelated signals from vision and touch like
the luminance (visual signal) and stiffness (haptic signal)
of an object (Ernst, 2007). In addition, Adams, Graf, and
Ernst (2004) trained subjects for about 1.5 h to induce a
shift in the “light-from-above” prior, an example of a
previously learned relationship between the environment
and the sensory input. However, to completely reverse a
previously learned relationship between the size of an
object and its estimated weight when compared to similar
objects (thus leading also to a reversal of the size–weight
illusion), Flanagan, Bittner, and Johansson (2008) needed
to train their subjects for at least 11 days. Here we show
just how vulnerable learning of a new correlation can be
when brief preexposure to the testing stimulus interferes
with training on a longer timescale.
To do this, we used a perceptually bistable stimulus for
which several different learning timescales are known to
be involved. Perceptual bistability can occur when one
and the same stimulus can be interpreted in two different
ways. A good example is the well-known Necker Cube
(Necker, 1832), which can be interpreted as if seen from
above or as if seen from below. At any given time, only
one of the two possible interpretations is perceived, but, if
the figure is viewed continuously over a longer period of
time, the percept will be experienced to alternate between
the two interpretations. Such stimuli have been of great
interest to psychologists and neuroscientists because the
visual input alone contains insufficient information to
drive the percept to one interpretation or the other and
therefore the perceptual conflict must be entirely resolved
within the perceptual system.
It is known for quite some time that one of the factors
involved in resolving the ambiguous input for a bistable
stimulus are in fact prior presentations of that same
stimulus. These influences usually manifest themselves as
short-term interactions, like negative aftereffects when
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subjects are presented with a disambiguated form of the
stimulus for at least a few seconds immediately prior to
being presented the ambiguous stimulus (e.g., for various
types of perceptually bistable stimuli: Brascamp, Knapen,
Kanai, van Ee, & van den Berg, 2007; Hochberg, 1950;
Kanai & Verstraten, 2005; Long, Toppino, & Mondin,
1992; Nawrot & Blake, 1989; Virsu, 1975; Wolfe, 1984).
In addition, short-term positive priming effects are known
to occur when a disambiguated form of the stimulus is
either presented very briefly, for just a few milliseconds,
before presenting the ambiguous stimulus or when there is
a pause of a few seconds between presenting the
disambiguated priming stimulus and the ambiguous
stimulus itself (e.g., for various types of bistable stimuli:
Brascamp et al., 2007; Chong & Blake, 2006; Kanai &
Verstraten, 2005; Long et al., 1992; Mitchell, Stoner, &
Reynolds, 2004). Positive priming also occurs when view-
ing the ambiguous stimulus intermittently, with intersti-
mulus intervals of about 1 s or more, in which case the
percept tends to be the same across the separate stimulus
presentations (e.g., Brascamp, Pearson, Blake, & van den
Berg, 2009; Leopold, Wilke, Maier, & Logothetis, 2002;
Maier, Wilke, Logothetis, & Leopold, 2003; Orbach,
Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963). The latter effect is often called
perceptual stabilization although it has been shown that
perceptual alternations do still occur in this case, only at
increasingly larger intervals with increasing interstimulus
intervals (Brascamp et al., 2009). Evidence has also been
found that the interactions across several stimulus inter-
vals can act on multiple independent timescales on the
order of seconds to even minutes (Brascamp et al., 2008;
Pastukhov & Braun, 2008). For example, Brascamp et al.
(2008) intermixed intermittent presentation with periods
of continuous viewing and found that the percept during
successive intermittent presentation periods also tended to
be the same, regardless of the last percept seen during the
intermediate continuous viewing period. In order for this
longer term stabilization to occur, the continuous viewing
period could take up to approximately a minute. Taken
together, the effects described so far span the range of
prior experience timescales from milliseconds to the order
of several minutes.
Interestingly, coming from a somewhat different direc-
tion, it has also been shown that learned biases for bistable
figures can last for days, and that reversing them requires
extensive retraining (Haijiang, Saunders, Stone, &
Backus, 2006). Haijiang et al. (2006) used a rotating
version of the Necker Cube, in which case the cube can be
perceived as rotating to the left (i.e., the front face moves
leftward) or rotating to the right. During a training phase,
they added depth cues in order to disambiguate the
bistable Necker Cube. Using such disambiguated stimuli,
they created a novel contingency by presenting subjects
with leftward motion on one location (e.g., above fixation)
and the rightward motion on another location (below
fixation). In test trials in which the stimulus was presented
without the disambiguation cues, it was found that
subjects had learned the contingency between stimulus
location and rotation direction. Interestingly, when sub-
jects came back the next day they still perceived the same
location–rotation direction contingency and to reverse the
contingency needed extensive retraining. In short, they
showed that a relatively brief exposure to an entirely new
contingency can result in persistent and relatively long-
lasting perceptual effects.
Haijiang et al. (2006) attributed these effects to a form
of associative learning: Pavlovian cue recruitment and,
consistent with the literature on Pavlovian learning, in
their paradigm, the training started immediately. How-
ever, in most of the perceptual learning literature1 the
methods commonly include a pretest prior to training and a
posttest after training. Such pretest–training–posttest para-
digms are often used to obtain a more quantifiable measure
on how the training relates to the change in perception. To
obtain such a quantifiable measure for learning a bias for a
bistable figure, we revisited the paradigm of Haijiang et al.
(2006) and included pre- and posttests to get a true
measure of the change in perception brought about by
the training. We realized, based on the prior presentation
effects described above, that there was an off chance that
the pretest might somewhat interfere with the training. To
our surprise, however, as will be clear from the results, we
found a much stronger pretest interference than antici-
pated and this interference was even to the extent that
subjects did not or hardly learned the trained percept–
location contingency at all. Here, we will describe the
experiments in which we found this strange effect and
tested certain hypotheses as to what aspect of the pretest
may have been causing the interference with subsequent
training.
Another interesting question is to what extent the
learned biases are specific to the training conditions used.
More specifically, if the rotating Necker Cube is used to
learn the biases, are these biases only applied when
presented with a Necker Cube? Or do these learned biases
generalize to other objects, like ambiguous spheres? This
question strongly bears on which level the learning occurs,
i.e., if high level object recognition is involved or if the
learning occurs more on a low level. If object recognition
is involved, the cube somehow has to be recognized as
such before it can influence which of the two possible
percepts is going to dominate. In other words, learning
should be specific for cubes alone and no transfer of the
learned biases to spheres is to be expected in this case.
However, if the learning occurs more on a low level, on
features that are common across different objects, the
learned biases should also be more commonly applied. In
this case, we would expect the biases learned explicitly for
cubes to fully transfer also to spheres that were not
included in the training. To investigate this question, in
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the experiments described here, the pre- and posttests
include both cube and sphere trials to test for such transfer
effects of learning.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we compared two different paradigms
to investigate perceptual learning of a location-dependent
perceptual bias: a training–posttest paradigm versus a
pretest–training–posttest paradigm. The first is similar to the
paradigm of Haijiang et al. (2006); except for the posttest,
and, therefore, serves as a control whether their results can
be replicated using our setup. The reasoning for the
second paradigm is that usually in learning experiments
posttest results are compared to pretest results to better
quantify the effect of training and to correct for a bias that
may have preexisted even without training. For each of
these two paradigms, a separate group of observers
participated and since for both groups the training schema
itself is exactly the same we initially did not expect to find
a very big difference in learning between the two groups.
Methods
Apparatus
Stimuli were displayed stereoscopically using a haplo-
scope. The half-images were displayed on separate CRT
monitors (60 Hz) and viewed via mirrors, one for each
eye. The resulting viewing distance was 50.5 cm. The
display area on the monitors was limited to approximately
20 by 20 degrees by physical apertures in front of the
monitors. A chin and head rest restricted the subjects’
head movements. Stimuli were created using OpenGl and
the C programming language.
Stimuli and task
At the beginning of each trial, subjects were presented
with a fixation square (4.5  4.5 arcmin) at the center of
the display area. Subjects initiated stimulus onset by
button press. The stimuli were 2-s animations of a cube, of
which the sides were covered with small squares, rotating
around a vertical axis (67 deg/s). For a stationary example
of the stimulus, see Figure 1A. The edges of the cube
subtended 2.4 deg and a single square on the cube’s
surface subtended 8.8 arcmin. Square density on the cube
surface was approximately 8.9 squares/deg2. The cube
was tilted with respect to the rotation axis such that one of
the cube’s diagonals was perpendicular to the rotation
axis. Cube starting rotation angle was randomized across
trials. Orthogonal projection was used to display the cube
in order to prevent perspective cues from influencing the
percept.
The cube was displayed 4.3 deg either above or below
the fixation square. On the other side of the fixation
square, also at a vertical distance of 4.3 deg, a single white
dot (diameter of 10 arcmin) moved at 53 arcmin/s either
leftward or rightward (see Figure 1B). The motion
direction (left or right) of the separate dot was randomized
across trials. The subject’s task was to indicate by
pressing one of two buttons whether this white dot moved
in the same or in the opposite direction as the cube’s front
face. This task was chosen to prevent a direct link
between the perceived rotation direction of the cube and
the required response and to make subjects less aware that
the perceived rotation direction of the cube was the actual
parameter of interest.
Without additional cues, the rotation direction of the
cube is ambiguous and can be perceived as rotating either
leftward or rightward. On training trials, the cube’s
rotation direction was disambiguated by presenting a
cylinder (radius of 34 arcmin; length of 9.1 deg) going
through the center of the cube along the rotation axis, and
by adding veridical stereoscopic depth information (bin-
ocular disparity). The cylinder occluded part of the
backside of the cube and together with the stereoscopic
depth cue this results in strong disambiguation of the
rotation direction. For each subject, the rotation direction
on training trials was always the same for each location
but different across locations. That is, trained contingen-
cies could either be leftward when presented above
fixation and rightward below or, vice versa leftward
rotation when presented below fixation and rightward
above. This was done in order to be able to distinguish
learning position as a cue from developing a general
perceptual bias that does not depend on location. The two
possible rotation direction/location contingencies for the
training were counterbalanced across subjects.
On test trials, the cube was shown without occlusion
and stereoscopic cues and the rotation direction of the
cube was ambiguous. The perceived rotation direction of
the cube on test trials will be informative whether or not
the subjects learned the rotation direction vs. cube
location contingencies. To completely remove any stereo-
scopic cues, the cube was presented monocularly, only to
the left eye, during test trials.
After each trial, subjects received feedback about their
response in the form of a smiling or a sad cartoon face for
a correct and an incorrect response, respectively. For an
incorrect response, subjects received an additional penalty
in the sense that they had to wait 6 s before they could
start the next trial. For correct responses, the feedback was
shown for 1 s. The feedback, on the ambiguous test trials,
was always positive, i.e., indicating a correct answer.
Training procedure
For a schematic of the training procedure, see Figure 1C.
During the training phase, the trials were divided into
blocks of 12 trials. The first 10 trials were always training
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trials and in 5 of these the cube was presented above and
in 5 below fixation in random order. The last two trials in
each training block were 2 test trials, one for each
location. Subjects performed 35 of these training blocks
(420 trials). Directly after the training phase, the word
“break” appeared on the screen and the subjects were
required to take a 5-min break before continuing to the
posttest phase. The break was inserted to prevent any
direct short-term aftereffects from contributing to the
posttest results. Subjects were told to do what ever they
want during the break except to close their eyes for the
whole period of the break. After the break, the fixation
square appeared again and subjects could continue the
experiment.
The posttest consisted of test trials only. For 50 of these
posttest trials, a cube was shown as before and cube
presentations were equally divided across the above and
below fixation locations of the cube. To test for transfer
effects to other objects, there were 30 additional posttest
trials in which a sphere (see Figure 1A) appeared instead
of the cube, again equally divided across the above and
below fixation locations. The presented sphere had a
radius of 1.7 deg and was covered in dots with a radius
of 3.4 arcmin. Dot density on the sphere surface was
Figure 1. (A) Examples of the used stimuli. On the left, a stereogram is shown, depicting the stimulus for a training trial with added stereo-
and occlusion cues (cross-fuse for 3D representation). For cube test trials (not shown), the gray bar was removed and the stimulus was
only presented to the left eye. On the right, the sphere stimulus, as used in the pre- and posttests, is depicted. (B) Schema for one trial.
Subjects initiated stimulus onset and a rotating cube and a moving dot were displayed. Subjects responded whether the dot moved in the
same or opposite direction as the front face of the cube, upon which they received feedback on the correctness of their response in the
form of a cartoon face. On test trials, subjects always received positive feedback. (C) Training schedule for the separate experimental
conditions. Gray blocks represent training trials; white blocks represent test trials. The red arrows indicate the trained contingencies (e.g.,
during training above ﬁxation is trained for leftward rotation to be perceived and below ﬁxation is trained for rightward rotation to be
perceived). Double-sided arrows indicate no correlation with the stimulus location. The separate conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 differ
only in the trials shown before the actual training starts.
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5.5 dots/(deg visual angle)2. Six additional, equally
spaced, semicircular lines from the top to the bottom of
the sphere added contour information. All cube and sphere
trials in the posttest were presented in random order.
In Experiment 1, the subjects were divided in two
groups. For each of these groups, the training, break, and
posttest schemas were exactly the same and the only
difference between the groups is what happened before the
training started. One group followed the procedure exactly
as described above, i.e., directly start the training phase
and afterward the posttest (“no pretest” group). The
second group of subjects (“pretest” group) was preex-
posed to the ambiguous stimulus in a pretest before the
training phase started. The procedure for the pretest was
exactly the same as for the posttest (50 ambiguous cube
trials and 30 sphere trials in random order and equally
divided across the two locations).
Participants
Participants were recruited from a general population
and for each condition 10 observers participated. Observers
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and stereo-acuity
was assessed using the Stereo Fly Test (Stereo Optical,
Chicago IL, USA). Subjects without good stereo-vision
were excluded from participation.
Results
The task is fairly easy to perform and for training trials
subjects can be expected to have a high accuracy. Most
subjects only made a few mistakes (average error rate
was 2.7%, which is equivalent to about 10 trials out of
the 350 training trials) and reported afterward that they
pressed the wrong button by accident on these cases.
However, there were also a few subjects who were not
very accurate on training trials and whose proportion of
correct responses was, although still above chance, below
87.5%. For these subjects, it is not clear how to interpret
the results for the test trials. Thus, subjects with a
proportion of correct responses below 87.5% on training
trials were excluded from the analysis and replaced by a
new participant.
Figure 2A displays the results for test trials for the two
different subject groups. The x-axis represents the phase
within the session, i.e., pretest (if included), training, and
posttest. The y-axis represents the percentage of all test
trials for each phase on which the perceived rotation
direction was in agreement with the trained direction;
100%means that subjects for both locations always saw the
cube rotating in the trained direction, indicating a complete
learning effect, and 0% means that subjects always saw the
cube rotating in the opposite direction than the direction
that was presented on training trials. To track learning
during the training phase, we divided the training phase in
7 chronological blocks, each consisting of 50 training and
10 test trials. For the training phase, the proportion of test
trials within such a block, for which the perceived rotation
direction of the cube was in the trained direction, is
displayed against the cumulative number of training trials
in the session.
The different colors depict the different subject groups.
Blue symbols and lines show the results for the no-pretest
group and red symbols and lines show the results for the
pretest group. The different symbols stand for the different
objects displayed on different test trials. Squares display
the results for cube trials and circles the results for sphere
trials. The sphere trials only occurred in the pre- and
posttests of the session. The error bars show 95%
confidence intervals for binomially distributed data across
all test trials for each phase (note that this means that
these estimates are based on several test trials per subject
rather than on a single representative value per subject).
The dashed line indicates chance level.
Figure 2A shows the results across subjects. Figures 2B
and 2C show the individual subject results for the no-
pretest and pretest groups, respectively. Each line in
Figures 2B and 2C represents one subject and only results
for cube trials are shown (for sphere trials, posttest results
are shown in Figure 4).
The results for the no-pretest group show clear learning
effects both during training and in the posttest: the
perceived rotation direction conform with the trained
direction on 80% of the cube test trials or more on
average. For 7 out of the 10 individual subjects, the
proportion perceived as trained are even very close to
100%. In addition, note that the training effect appears to
be virtually immediate, i.e., even after as few as 50
training trials the proportion of test trials seen as trained is
already about 80% and significantly above chance. This
could mean that only a few trials are necessary to learn a
location contingent bias, but note that during training also
short-term priming effects (e.g., Kanai, Knapen, van Ee, &
Verstraten, 2007; Kanai & Verstraten, 2005; Long et al.,
1992) additionally cause the perceived rotation direction
for test trials to be in the trained direction. Thus from the
no-pretest group results during training alone it is unclear
how many trials are sufficient to ensure a long-term
retention of the bias. That the bias is really learned
becomes clear only from the posttest results. Short-term
priming effects should have decayed during the 5-min
break and therefore cannot be responsible for the
significant learning effect there. Furthermore, the results
in the posttest for cube and sphere test trials are quite
similar and also for the sphere the proportion of rotation
direction seen as trained is significantly different from
chance (p = 0.006 in a signed rank test across proportions
per subject). This indicates that the learning effect
generalizes to a different object class.
Such learning effects, as reported here for the no-pretest
group, have previously been demonstrated by Haijiang
et al. (2006), whose experimental design differed in the
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size of the cubes (14 deg versus 2.4 deg in our experiment),
distance between fixation and cube locations (9.4 deg vs.
4.3 deg), stimulus duration (8.33 s vs. 2 s), the method of
stereoscopic display (red–green anaglyphs vs. haplo-
scope), and viewing distance (200 cm vs. 50.5 cm). So
the results for the no-pretest group replicate the results of
Haijiang et al. (2006) and demonstrate that the previously
reported learning effect is relatively robust across small
variations in experimental conditions and methods. Note
though that our results appear to be slightly more variable
across subjects than was the case in Haijiang et al.’s
(2006) study, i.e., in our experiment there were 3 subjects
that did not learn the location–rotation direction con-
tingency, whereas in the study of Haijiang et al. (2006) all
the subjects learned. In principle, all of the small variations
in experimental condition mentioned above could have
Figure 2. Results for Experiment 1. (A) The percentage trained direction perceived on test trials is shown versus the phase in the
experimental session (pretest, training phase in blocks of 50 training trials (10 test trials), and posttest). The two colors represent the
subject groups, blue: no-pretest group; red: pretest group. Squares show results for cube trials and circles for sphere trials. Error bars
represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. The dashed line represents chance level. For the pretest group, training appears to be less effective
compared to the no-pretest group. (B, C) Each line represents the results for an individual subject for the no-pretest and pretest groups,
respectively.
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contributed to this slight difference in results. However, for
the short-term perceptual stabilization effect it has been
shown that for two separate retinotopic locations the short-
term memory traces become more and more independent
with increasing distance between the locations (Knapen,
Brascamp, Adams, & Graf, 2009). If the long-term
perceptual memory studied here operates on similar
retinotopic principles, the increase in variability across
subjects in our study could partially be due to the smaller
distance between the two training locations.
As noted before, we did not expect to find a big
difference between the pretest group and the no-pretest
group since in principle the training scheme is the same
for both groups. Instead, we assumed that the pretest
would not or hardly interfere with the training. The
advantage of including the pretest would have been that
posttest results could have been compared with an initial
bias, were it not for the fact that we were very much
mistaken in the above assumption. As can be seen in the
results, the difference between the pretest group and the
no-pretest group is quite drastic and subjects in the pretest
group hardly appear to have learned (only 2 subjects in the
pretest group had a perceptual bias during the posttest that
was consistent with the trained direction and a signed rank
test across subjects’ individual proportions did not show a
significant difference from chance; p = 0.13).
To see in what way the pretest is interfering with the
later training, it is useful to look in more detail at
individual subject data for the two training locations
separately (see Figure 3). Here it is important to note that
a proportion of 50% test trials seen as trained for an
individual subject in Figure 2C does not necessarily mean
that the average percept for each of the two separate
locations was completely unbiased. The 50% proportion
could also be a result of subjects having a bias completely
in the trained direction for one of the two locations (100%)
and for the other location a bias completely opposite to
training (0%). In other words, the 50% results for subjects
in the pretest group could mean that subjects did have
strong perceptual biases for each separate location but that
these biases just did not correspond to the trained
contingency. We wondered whether this was the case and
if any biases that subjects might have obtained during the
pretest could be responsible for the interference with the
training afterward. Figure 3 shows the individual subject
data separately for the two training locations. In Figure 3,
each column represents a single subject (the order in which
the results for individual subjects are displayed is such to
more easily detect commonalities across the individual
subject results). The top row shows the results for the
above fixation location and the bottom row shows the
results for the below fixation location. Results are
displayed as proportion of test trials seen as trained
separately for test trials in the pretest (light gray bars),
during training (intermediate gray bars), and in the posttest
(dark gray bars). What can be seen is that indeed the
individual subject pretest biases for each separate location
(light gray bars) were relatively strong: only one subject
had an initial bias that was close to chance for one location
(subject 2, top graph), all the other separate biases per
location were significantly below or above chance and most
even close to either 0% or 100%. Comparing the biases
observed in the posttest to the ones observed in the pretest,
we see that most subjects (7 out of 10) stick to the initial
biases they had observed in the pretest for both locations.
So for 7 out 10 subjects the pretest biases seem to dominate
in the posttest. In contrast, only for two subjects (subjects 9
and 10) the posttest results are more or less consistent with
the trained directions for both locations but note that for one
of these subjects that already happened to be the case in the
pretest.
In short, what can be seen in Figure 3 is that particularly
during the posttest the subjects’ perceptual bias corre-
sponds more to their initial perceptual bias, observed
during the pretest, than the contingencies they are exposed
to during training.2 This indicates that perceptual biases
Figure 3. Individual subject results separated for the two training locations for the pretest group only. Each column represents a single
subject (the order in which the results are displayed is such to more easily detect commonalities between individual subjects). The top row
shows the results for the above ﬁxation location and the bottom row shows the results for below ﬁxation. Results are displayed as
proportion of test trials seen as trained for test trials in the pretest (light gray bars), during training (intermediate gray bars), and in the
posttest (dark gray bars). For individual subjects, perceived rotation directions for test trials in the posttest appear to correspond more to
the initial biases observed in the pretest rather than to the trained biases.
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may be fixed very early on and later training is not as
effective as the initially obtained bias. To examine if, and
if so how, the initial perceptual history can influence later
learning mechanisms, we conducted Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
From Experiment 1, it is evident that presenting an
observer with a pretest interferes with later perceptual
learning in this paradigm. The perceived rotation direction
during the pretest was not experimentally controlled in
Experiment 1 and therefore accidental correlations may
have existed and already have been learned at this stage.
Therefore, in Experiment 2, we tested whether any such
previous correlation between location and perceived
rotation direction observed during the pretest may have
been the cause for the interference with learning a
different correlation during training. We tested two
hypotheses concerning possible accidental correlations.
The first hypothesis is that the results in Experiment 1
could be due to a “learned irrelevance.” During the pretest
where the percept for the rotating cube was ambiguous,
and therefore not controlled experimentally, subjects may
have learned that the location cue is irrelevant and
therefore fail to learn the location cue when it does
become relevant during the training phase. This hypoth-
esis closely corresponds to Pavlovian latent inhibition,
where preexposure to the conditioned stimulus results in
slower Pavlovian learning. For example, the analogous
experiment in the animal learning literature is that if you
expose a rat to a tone that is uncorrelated with food, it will
take longer for the rat to learn, subsequently, that a tone
predicts reward, as compared to not presenting the
uninformative tone before training. To test this “learned
irrelevance” hypothesis in our paradigm, we simulated a
pretest, i.e., instead of showing ambiguous cubes in the
pretest we showed disambiguated cubes (with the same
occlusion and stereo-cues as described for Experiment 1)
and in this way controlled the observed perceptual history.
During this simulated pretest, 50% of the cubes and
spheres were presented rotating leftward and 50% were
presented rotating rightward on both locations and in
random order, thus ensuring that during this pretraining
phase there was no correlation whatsoever between
location and perceived rotation direction. After this initial
phase, the remaining training, break, and posttest proce-
dures were the same as in Experiment 1. If the initial
phase of the experiment is important for the system to
determine whether a certain source of information is
relevant, in this case the location cue, then no learning
should occur in this condition since there is no correlation
between perception and location at the beginning of the
experiment. We will refer to this condition as the
“uncorrelated prephase” condition.
The second hypothesis concerns the results in Figure 3,
which indicates that an initial bias, obtained during the
pretest, may be stronger than the bias that is subsequently
being trained on. To test this hypothesis again, a
pretraining phase with perceptually controlled disambig-
uated cubes and spheres was conducted before training
started. During this prephase, the rotation direction for
each location was 100% opposite to the subsequently
trained direction. Training, break, and posttest procedures
were again the same as in Experiment 1. This condition
will be referred to as the “reverse prephase” condition and
if the initial perceptual history is stronger than the later
training trials, training is expected to have no or at least
less of an effect on posttest results. So again no learning
due to the training phase is expected.
Two groups of 10 observers each participated in this
experiment, none of whom had participated in the previous
conditions. All observers had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and good stereo-vision.
Results of Experiment 2
The posttest results for Experiment 2 together with the
previous results of Experiment 1 are displayed in Figure 4.
From left to right, the graphs in Figure 4 show the results
for Experiment 1 (no-pretest vs. pretest condition),
Experiment 2 with prephases consisting of disambiguated
trials (either uncorrelated or 100% reversed from training
direction) and a further control condition, which will be
described below. The top row displays the proportion of
test trials for which the perceived rotation direction was in
the same direction as trained across subjects. Green bars
represent the results for cube trials and brown bars
represent the results for sphere trials. Error bars depict
95% confidence intervals. The black dashed line repre-
sents chance level.
The middle row of the graphs displays the posttest results
for individual subjects in each group. For each subject, the
proportion of test trials seen as trained is shown for cube
trials (green squares) as well as for sphere trials (brown
circles). For each subject, cube and sphere results are
connected by a gray line. The black dashed line indicates
chance level and the green and brown dashed lines
represent the one-sided significance boundaries for indi-
vidual subject cube and sphere results, respectively. The
bottom row shows the proportion of subjects that individ-
ually showed a significant learning effect. Subjects were
determined to have a significant learning effect if their
posttest results for cube trials (green bars) were signifi-
cantly above 50% chance level and the perceptual biases
for both locations were in the trained direction. Brown bars
show the results of the same analysis for sphere trials. Error
bars show the 95% confidence intervals for the proportions.
The black dashed line depicts chance level, which in this
case is 25% since the bias at both separate locations needed
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Figure 4. Posttest results for Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the control condition. From left to right, the graphs show the results for
Experiment 1 (no-pretest vs. pretest condition), Experiment 2 with prephases consisting of disambiguated trials (either uncorrelated or
reversed training direction), and the no-test-trials-during-training condition. (Top) The proportion of test trials for which the perceived
rotation direction was in the same direction as trained for cube trials (green bars) and sphere trials (brown bars). Error bars represent 95%
conﬁdence intervals; the dashed line represents chance level. (Middle) Posttest results for individual subjects in each group. Green
squares indicate results for cube trials, brown circles for sphere trials. Cube and sphere results for individual subjects are connected by
gray lines. The black dashed line represents chance level and the green and brown dashed lines represent the 0.05 one-sided
signiﬁcance boundaries for cube trials and sphere trials, respectively. (Bottom) The proportion of subjects that individually showed a
signiﬁcant learning effect for cube trials (green bars) and sphere trials (brown bars). Error bars represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals; the
dashed line represents chance level. For cube trials, all groups except the pretest group in Experiment 1 show very strong learning
effects.
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to correspond to the trained direction in order for the
subject to be counted as having learned.
What can be seen in these graphs is that all groups
except the pretest group from Experiment 1 show very
strong learning effects. This is somewhat surprising
especially if the result for the pretest condition of
Experiment 1 is compared with the results from Experi-
ment 2. As noted before, the accidental perceptual biases
observed during the pretest in Experiment 1 were
relatively strong and for most subjects did not correspond
to the subsequently trained directions, at least not for both
locations. This means that subjects were initially exposed
to a different correlation than that which they were
subsequently trained on. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we
especially expected to find similar results for the reverse
prephase condition in which subjects also are initially
exposed to a different correlation, this time experimentally
controlled. Instead, in Experiment 2 we find a strong
learning effect in both the disambiguated prephase con-
ditions when compared to the pretest condition of Experi-
ment 1 for which the only difference is that ambiguous test
trials were used in the pretest. This suggests a fundamental
difference between ambiguous test and disambiguated
training trials in terms of the contribution to the learning
process. A bias obtained from viewing ambiguous test
trials appears to be much stronger than a bias obtained
from viewing disambiguated training trials.
Control condition
The difference in results between the pretest condition
in Experiment 1 and the disambiguated prephase con-
ditions of Experiment 2 suggests that there may be a
strong difference between training trials and test trials in
terms of learning the bias. Furthermore, in the pretest
condition of Experiment 1 just 80 test trials were sufficient
to seriously hamper any learning from 350 subsequent
training trials, more than 4 times the same amount. Does
this mean that any correlation learning is stronger for test
trials than for training trials?
In our paradigm, as well as the paradigms of Backus
and Haijiang (2007) and Haijiang et al. (2006) the training
trials were always interleaved with test trials during the
training phase. So from these earlier results it is not clear
whether it is important for the training phase to include
test trials besides the training trials and whether the
learning effect hinges on these test trials rather than the
training trials. In order to verify whether training trials by
themselves can elicit the learning effect we repeated the
no-pretest condition of Experiment 1, but this time the
interleaved test trials during training, i.e., the 2 test trials
after every 10 training trials (see Methods section and
Figure 1C), were replaced with 2 additional training trials,
one for each location. After training, the procedures for
the break and posttest were the same as before. If learning
hinges completely on the interleaved test trials during
training, then no learning should occur in this case,
whereas if training trials do contribute to the learning
effect we should find similar results to the no-pretest
condition of Experiment 1.
Again 10 observers who had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, good stereovision, and who had not
participated in any of the previous conditions participated.
The results for this control condition are also depicted in
Figure 4, the rightmost graph in each row. The results show
that learning occurs for most subjects in this condition as
well, indicating that training trials do contribute to the
learning effect.
Experiment 3
The interference effect of Experiment 1 raises another
question: namely, is the learning process based on
acquiring knowledge about a global correlation between
location and rotation direction? This would be equivalent
to learning the function f(x), where f represents the percept
dependent on the retinal location x based on the global
history. Alternatively, the learning process could involve
multiple independent, retinally localized learners, with
each only taking into account the local history. So far, the
paradigm used lead to the same predictions for these two
possibilities. However, with the interference effect we can
piece the two apart by pretesting on one location only and
examining the effect of subsequent training on several
locations. If the underlying mechanism learns the global
correlation between location and perceived rotation
direction, this one location pretest should still interfere
with learning over all locations, since it interferes with
learning f(x). If instead the learning mechanism involves
separate localized learners, the pretest should only
interfere with learning at the same location at which it
was performed and not on other locations.
Methods
The paradigm for Experiment 3 was similar to the
pretest condition in Experiment 1. The only difference is
that the pretest was performed on only one location, i.e.,
either above or below fixation. This pretest contained
25 cube test trials and 15 sphere trials, which is consistent
with the pretest conditions in Experiment 1 for a single
location. The pretest location was counterbalanced across
subjects to be above or below fixation.
In the pretest, a bias was obtained and the rotation
direction for the subsequent training trials was in the
opposite direction as this bias on both locations. For
example, if a subject showed a rightward bias during the
pretest on the below fixation location, the subsequent
training trials would show leftward rotation on both the
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above and below fixation locations. Note that we can only
be certain about the initial bias on the location that the
pretest was performed at. However, in the pretest of
Experiment 1, 80% of the subjects exhibited the same bias
in perceived rotation direction on both locations. Addi-
tional data from pilot experiments also suggest that
subjects generally have the same directional bias on both
the above and below fixation locations. Therefore, we can
safely assume that the initial bias, if also measured on the
non-pretested location, would be similar for both loca-
tions. Note that this is consistent with the study by Carter
and Cavanagh (2007) who investigated existing location-
dependent biases at several different retinal locations for a
bistable stimulus and whose results indicate that although
biases can differ across locations there usually is one
percept that dominates most locations. Therefore, their
Figure 5. Similar to Figure 2 but now for Experiment 3. (A) Results for the non-pretest location (blue line and symbols) and the pretest
location (red line and symbols) are shown separately. The bar chart inset shows the proportion of subjects for which the results
conform with the separate localized learners hypothesis (left bar) or conform with a global correlation learning hypothesis (right bar).
(B, C) Individual subject data for the non-pretest location and pretest location, respectively. Results show that the pretest only interferes at
the location it was performed at, which is in agreement with a separate localized learners hypothesis.
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results also indicate that the chance of the bias being the
same at a subsample of two specific locations is relatively
high.
The schemes for training and posttest were the same as
for Experiment 1, except that, as noted above, the trained
rotation directions for the above and below fixation locations
were in the same direction rather than in opposite directions.
As before, 10 observers who had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, good stereovision, and who had not partici-
pated in any of the previous conditions participated.
Results
Figure 5 shows the results for Experiment 3. In
Figure 5A, the proportion of test trials seen as trained,
across all subjects, is shown versus phase within a session,
i.e., pretest, training blocks, and posttest. Note that on the
x-axis we now plot the number of training trials per
location since the results are shown separately for the non-
pretest location (blue line and symbols) and the pretest
location (red line and symbols). Cube trial results are
depicted by squares, sphere trial results by circles. In
Figures 5B and 5C, each line represents the results for
cube trials for a single subject for the non-pretest location
and the pretest location, respectively.
For the pretest itself, the results are very close to zero,
both on average (Figure 5A) and for each individual
subject (Figure 5C). This means that subjects show a very
strong initial preference for seeing the cube rotate in a
specific direction. Furthermore, for the non-pretest location
the pretest hardly interferes, i.e., there is strong learning
trend for this location (Figures 5A, blue line, and 5B).
However, for the location where the pretest was
performed (red line, Figures 5A and 5C), the training
hardly seems to have any effect and in the posttest eight
out of the ten subjects still have a bias in the same
direction as in the pretest. Thus, the results show that the
pretest on one location only interferes with training for
that particular location and does not globally affect the
learning.
The bar chart inset shows the extent to which these
results are consistent with each of the two global learning
or localized learners hypotheses. The left bar shows the
proportion of subjects that in the posttest showed the
result of interference on only the pretest location, which
is according to the localized learners hypothesis. The
right bar shows the proportion of subjects that showed
interference on both training locations according to the
prediction based on learning more global correlations
between location and rotation direction. This bar chart
clearly shows that the results favor the separate
localized learners hypothesis. Note that the two bars in
the graph sum up to 80% of the subjects. For the
remaining two subjects, the training was effective on
both locations.
Discussion
Previously, it has been shown, by exposing human
subjects to new correlations with the world they operate
in, that their perceptual biases and a priori knowledge are
continuously being updated (e.g., Adams et al., 2004;
Ernst, 2007; Flanagan et al., 2008). Recently, in one
particular study it was shown that for a bistable stimulus,
the rotating Necker Cube, a new correlation between
perceived rotation direction and a location cue can be
learned in a very short amount of time (Haijiang et al.,
2006). The resulting location-dependent biases needed
extensive retraining in order to reverse. Such strong and
long-lasting effects could be due to subjects not having
encountered the specific stimulus before training starts
and therefore there being no previous bias that the new
correlation has to compete against. In this study, we
examined the role of preexposure to the ambiguous
stimulus on learning a perceptual bias dependent on
location. We found that preexposing subjects to the
ambiguous stimulus in a pretest hugely interfered with
the subsequent training. This interference effect was not
due to having already obtained a perceptual history, as
was shown by the results of Experiment 2. Rather, the
combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate a
fundamental difference between training and test trials.
Biases obtained using test trials may be stronger and more
long-lived than ones obtained using training trials. Last
but not least, the results for Experiment 3 show that the
learning mechanism does not focus on a global correla-
tion between location and perceived rotation direction
but rather involves independent separately localized
learners.
Intermittent presentation of bistable ﬁgures
In this study, we used an ambiguous stimulus, the
rotating Necker Cube, to test for learning of location-
contingent biases. The perception of such figures, when
presented continuously, usually switches between two
different states over time. However, with intermittent
presentation, like in our pre- and posttests, this perceptual
cycle tends to slow down (Brascamp et al., 2009; Leopold
et al., 2002; Maier et al., 2003; Orbach et al., 1963). This
means that observers usually have the same percept for a
longer period of time when viewing the ambiguous figure
intermittently compared to continuous viewing. This
effect is often referred to as perceptual stabilization. Apart
from the percept surviving interleaved blanks with
intermittent viewing, there have also been reports about
more long-lasting effects of stabilization (Brascamp et al.,
2008; Pastukhov & Braun, 2008). Especially, Brascamp
et al. (2008) showed that the percept seen during a
previous stabilization period tends to also be observed in
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the next stabilization period. This occurs even when the
two subsequent stabilization periods are separated by a
period of time for which the stimulus is presented
continuously and long enough for the observer to have
experienced several perceptual reversals. Even when the
last percept during this continuous viewing period is the
opposite compared to the last winner during stabilization,
the next percept to win when the stimulus is shown
intermittently again is most likely the last stabilization
winner and not the most recent percept. According to
Brascamp et al. (2008), this effect takes about a minute of
continuous viewing to decay completely.
This stabilization effect will also have influenced the
stability of the percept in our pre- and posttests for which
the ambiguous stimulus was viewed in an intermittent
fashion. That is, the fact that in our pre- and posttest the
subjects’ biases are almost completely in one direction
will, at least partially, be due to this stabilization effect. In
addition, the stabilization could in this way be responsible
for allowing a small initial perceptual bias to be reinforced
during the pretest in Experiment 1. However, the stabiliza-
tion effect cannot, by itself, explain the sign of these
biases. For the pretest, there is nothing to direct the bias in
a particular direction that is consistent across subjects. For
the posttest, subjects were obliged to take a 5-min break
before continuing with the posttest procedure. Although
blank periods have been shown to be less effective for
decay of priming effects than a neutral stimulus (Kanai
et al., 2007), we expect that during this time any relatively
short-term effect should have decayed and therefore is
unlikely to be responsible for the results.
Furthermore, the short-term stabilization effect cannot
possibly account for the differences in posttest results
between our experimental groups. Any tentative explan-
ation based on short-term adaption or priming effects
would weigh recent trials more heavily than trials that
happened at the very beginning of the experiment and
therefore predict similar results in the posttest for all
conditions given that the training conditions were the same.
In that sense, especially the results for the pretest group in
Experiment 1 present a curious puzzle when compared to
the other experimental groups. For this condition, the
posttest results indicate that the biases obtained after
only 80 trials in the pretest completely override the more
than 4 times as extensive subsequent training. Interest-
ingly enough, as can be seen in Figures 2C, 3, and 5C,
there are some subjects for whom the training after the
pretest initially does appear to be effective at the start of
training. If their perceptual biases were governed by
stabilization effects alone, these subjects should have
stuck to the trained percepts from then on. Instead they
switch back to their original biases, obtained in the
pretest, usually already during training, and especially in
the posttest, after the 5-min break, the biases are
consistent again with the ones observed in the pretest.
So it seems that there is a more long-term perceptual
bias at play here on which disambiguated trials have less
of an impact. Even taking into account that adaption and
priming for bistable stimuli is likely to occur at several
timescales (Brascamp et al., 2008, 2009; Pearson &
Brascamp, 2008), it will be very hard to explain this
particular result especially when compared to the results
for the other conditions.
Test trials vs. training trials
In Experiment 2, we mimicked the pretest condition of
Experiment 1 using disambiguated training trials in the
preexposure phase instead of ambiguous test trials. In this
way, we simulated two possible causes for the interference
effect in two separate conditions. In one condition, the
disambiguated preexposure phase indicated the location
cue to be irrelevant; in the second condition, the correlation
in the preexposure phase was the complete opposite with
respect to the subsequent training. However, in both cases
learning still occurred (see Figure 4), i.e., the percepts
during training and in the posttest were consistent with the
trained direction rather than being random or opposite.
This shows that training trials themselves do not, or
hardly, interfere with later training trials, whereas from
Experiment 1 we know that test trials do. This is also
consistent with recent work that shows that correlation
between test and training trials decays about after 4 trials
(Fuller, Backus, van Dam, & Ernst, 2009).
The fact that preexposure using training trials does not
interfere with training, indicates that the interference due
to the pretest in Experiment 1 is not due to having
previously obtained a perceptual history, since the
percepts for training and test trials are relatively similar.
Rather, the comparison between the results of Experi-
ments 1 and 2 indicate that there must be a more
fundamental difference between training trials and test
trials. For short-term aftereffects, differences between
ambiguous and unambiguous figures have been found
before. For instance measuring aftereffects after viewing
an ambiguous stimulus or an unambiguous stimulus for a
brief interval can be in opposite directions (Kanai et al.,
2007; Kanai & Verstraten, 2005; Pearson & Clifford,
2005). Here we show for the first time that ambiguous and
disambiguated figures can have different effects on a
longer timescale as well.
So what is causing the difference in results between test
and training trials in our paradigm? In terms of cube
percepts, training and test trials are relatively similar but
the difference in the way of how to obtain the percept is
obvious. In training trials, there are additional disparity
and occlusion cues specifying how the cube should be
perceived. A perceptual bias will have little to add in this
case since it will be overwhelmed by the available
evidence in the stimulus that the cube is rotating in a
particular direction. For test trials, however, there is no
signal specifying how the cube should be perceived, and
the resulting perceptual ambiguity is completely resolved
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within the perceptual system. For test trials, a perceptual
bias will therefore play a huge role. For this reason, if for
test trials the visual system regards the resulting percept as
a correct interpretation it will also regard this percept as
more informative about in what direction to change (learn)
the bias. The next time the same stimulus is presented the
observer will thus also be more likely to have the same
percept. For training trials, the resulting percept is more
related to the accurate interpretation of the additional
cues, rather than being informative for the perceptual bias,
and therefore, the perceptual bias is updated to a lesser
extent. This difference in effectiveness in updating a bias
might be the reason that a bias obtained using test trials is
able to survive a much larger amount of training trials.
The reasoning here is consistent with results from previous
studies on learning a new light-from-above prior. Adams
et al. (2004) showed that subjects can learn a new light-
from-above prior when haptic feedback was provided
about the correct interpretation of the visually ambiguous
training stimuli. However, when on top of the haptic
feedback visual disambiguation cues were added to the
training stimuli the learning effect was greatly reduced
(Graf, Adams, & Bouzit, 2007).
Another possibility to explain the difference between
training and test trials is if the learning process takes place
entirely within the process of resolving the ambiguous
input, i.e., the rivalry process. For training trials, due to
the additional cues, the competition for dominance
between the two different interpretations is more or less
bypassed, since dominance is already specified in the
sensory input. So if somehow for the learning to occur
competition for dominance is necessary, this could also
explain why an initial bias obtained with training trials
is less strong than an initial bias obtained for test
trials.
Transfer of learning to new objects
The transfer effects of training using cubes to testing
with spheres has not yet been discussed in great detail so
far. Although Figure 4 hints that there is a strong
correlation between cube and sphere trials in the posttest,
we performed a separate analysis addressing this question
more specifically. In order to verify whether there is such
a correlation, Figure 6 shows the percentage that spheres
in the posttest were perceived in the trained direction
versus the percentage that cubes in the posttest were
perceived as trained. The results are shown together for all
six conditions in this study and separate conditions can
be distinguished by the symbols used. For each subject,
2 points are shown, one for each separate location. Since
there is a large amount of overlap between the data points,
the data points have been jittered slightly about their
actual values for reasons of clarity. What is clear from this
figure is that posttest biases for spheres are very similar to
biases for the cubes on which the training was explicitly
focused. The correlation between the sphere and cube
biases is highly significant (Pearson’s r = 0.93; p¡ 0.001).
This indicates that learning the rotation direction for
cubes, to a large extent, transfers to different object
shapes. This, in turn, strongly suggests that the underlying
learning mechanism focuses on aspects that are common
for both shapes, for instance local motion patterns, rather
than involving more high-level object recognition.
Although, here it is important to note that the spheres
were presented in the same block of trials as the cubes, so
stabilization effects might have been responsible for the
high correlation (Maier et al., 2003). To separate the
transfer from stabilization effects and to find out what
exactly the common aspects are requires further study.
Long-term learning vs. short-term priming
One question that one might ask is if this long-term
learning effect investigated here is not just an extremely
long timescale of the same mechanism responsible for
the short-term priming effects, given that the pattern of
observed results seems quite similar; for example,
Figure 6. Individual subject posttest results for the proportion of
spheres perceived to be rotating in the same direction as trained
versus the proportion of cubes perceived to be rotating in the
same direction as trained. The results for each individual subject
are shown as 2 points, one for each training location, in the graph.
The different symbols represent the different experimental groups.
Because results from different conditions largely overlap, the
symbols are jittered about their actual locations for clarity. Across
all groups, there is a highly signiﬁcant correlation between rotation
directions perceived for spheres and cubes.
Journal of Vision (2010) 10(8):15, 1–17 van Dam & Ernst 14
Downloaded From: http://jov.arvojournals.org/pdfaccess.ashx?url=/data/Journals/JOV/933477/ on 07/26/2016
long-term as well as and short-term “learning” effects, both
transfer to different objects, indicating that common
features from the objects are involved in the learning
process (Maier et al., 2003, and see results here). In
addition, both effects appear to be mostly based on a
retinotopic organization rather than outside world coor-
dinates (Backus & Haijiang, 2007; Knapen et al., 2009).
Thus, they seem to involve retinally localized learners
(although note that short-term stabilization has been
shown to extend at least somewhat beyond the exact
stimulation location; Knapen et al., 2009).
Short-term priming has been explained as the result of
perceptual memory within the more general process of
bistable figure perception and perceptual alternations.
That is, the current understanding for bistable figure
perception includes a “memory trace” that more or less
tracks the prior perceptual history (for theoretical models,
see, e.g., Brascamp et al., 2008, 2009; Gigante, Mattia,
Braun, & Del Giudice, 2009; Noest, van Ee, Nijs, & van
Wezel, 2007). However, in light of the current results
there are two things that these models, at least in their
current form, can hardly explain. The first observation that
cannot be explained is the difference in results between
test and training trials in the pretest. In terms of strength
of the perceptual memory trace, the models do not
strongly differentiate between the percept being the result
of the competition when viewing an ambiguous stimulus
(i.e., for test trials) or the percept being the result of a
disambiguated stimulus (for training trials). Therefore,
these models would predict similar results for both
preexposure conditions that either use ambiguous or
disambiguated preexposure trials. This is not what we
found. Second, these models cannot explain why the more
extensive and controlled perceptual history during training
fails to override the relatively short history during pretest.
In short, it is likely that the memory trace for the long-
term learning effects investigated here is governed by a
different kind of process than the ones described in the
models mentioned above.
The preexposure interference suggests a more conven-
tional learning mechanism that keeps track of prior
information, weighting each new input relative to existing
information. That is, if the prior information is still
relatively sparse at the beginning of the experiment, this
would explain why initial trials have a relatively large
effect, compared to later trials. Furthermore, such a
mechanism is more likely to weigh ambiguous and
disambiguated stimuli differently based on their respective
salience (see Test trials vs. training trials section above).
In addition, such a mechanism would explain the long-
term retention of the obtained biases (Carter & Cavanagh,
2007; Haijiang et al., 2006), since there is no decay of the
bias if the system is not acquiring new information.
In conclusion, an updated model for the perception of
ambiguous figures would ideally incorporate both a
competition/percept adaptation mechanism (as in, e.g., Noest
et al., 2007) to explain the short-term effects (including
negative aftereffects) as well as a prior information/bias
updating mechanism to explain the long-term learning
effects. Given that both short- and long-term effects seem
to depend on similar retinal location conditions, these two
mechanisms are likely to be closely tied and coupled
retinotopically. Such a closely coupled hybrid model
would also explain why a previous attempt to train
subjects to obtain a sound-contingent bias for a bistable
stimulus failed (Haijiang et al., 2006). It also makes it
unlikely that other cues that do not in any way relate to
the retinotopic organization will work this easily. How-
ever, future research will have to verify the full merit of
such a hybrid model.
Conclusion
Here we investigated the role of preexposure for
learning location-contingent biases for an ambiguous
stimulus. We found that presenting the subjects with the
ambiguous stimulus in a pretest prior to training strongly
interferes with learning the trained biases. When simulat-
ing a pretest using disambiguated training trials, no such
interference occurs. Therefore, we concluded that the
interference does not depend on the perceptual history
alone but rather that there is a fundamental difference
between test and training trials in terms of learning a
perceptual bias. The results further indicate that the
learning mechanism does not necessarily seek out global
correlations between location and rotation direction but
involves multiple localized perceptual learners. Further,
we found that the learned biases for the rotating Necker
Cubes mostly transfer to ambiguous rotating spheres. This
suggests that learning the perceptual bias occurs on
features that are common in both figures, rather than
involving higher level object-based learning. A new
framework for an updated model for the perception of
ambiguous figures is suggested, which would tie in these
new results with existing findings.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Massimiliano Di Luca,
Benjamin T. Backus, and two anonymous reviewers for
helpful discussions and insightful comments and Jasmin
Steinwender and Verena Eikmeier for running subjects.
This research was supported by the Human Frontier
Science Program and EU Grant 27141 “ImmerSence.”
Commercial relationships: none.
Corresponding author: Loes C. J. van Dam.
Email: loes.van.dam@tuebingen.mpg.de.
Address: Spemannstrasse 41, 72076 Tu¨bingen, Germany.
Journal of Vision (2010) 10(8):15, 1–17 van Dam & Ernst 15
Downloaded From: http://jov.arvojournals.org/pdfaccess.ashx?url=/data/Journals/JOV/933477/ on 07/26/2016
Footnotes
1
Here it is important to note that “perceptual learning”
can have two different meanings in the existing literature.
Most perceptual learning studies concern cases where
observers get better at a perceptual task due to training.
Other studies define “perceptual learning” as a change in
perception or appearance due to training. The current
study concerns the latter.
2
Note that this cannot be due to the response feedback
always being positive during the pretest: a separate control
experiment in which no feedback about the correctness of
the response was provided led to similar results.
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